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IN GENERAL PUBLIC USE: AN UNNECESSARY TEST IN 
FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES USING ADVANCED 
SENSING TECHNOLOGY 
Mike Petridis* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Kyllo v. United States1 created a rule with an unnecessary test 
that can allow law enforcement to search a home, a person’s castle, 
without a warrant.  The Kyllo rule states: “[O]btaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the 
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 
‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search—
at least where . . . the technology in question is not in general public 
use.”2  This rule was intended to be forward-looking and anticipate 
future technology.3  However, the “general public use” test is a 
loophole that can be used by future law enforcement officers to 
conduct warrantless searches of homes in violation of Fourth 
Amendment principles. 
Danny Kyllo’s (“Kyllo”) home was scanned by an Agema 
Thermovision 210, a thermal imager after law enforcement officials 
suspected him of growing marijuana.4  The scan of the home 
determined that certain areas of the house were at a higher temperature 
than surrounding homes.5  The temperature difference indicated a 
 
* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2021; Hunter College, B.A. 
in Political Science 2013.  I would like to thank my friend John Ladis for his help and support 
over the years. 
1  533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
2  Id. at 34 (citation omitted). 
3 Id. at 36.  “[T]he rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are 
already in use or in development.”  Id. 
4 Id. at 29. 
5 Id. at 30. 
1
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strong possibility Kyllo was running halide lights,6 which are used in 
the growing of marijuana.7  Based on the thermal imaging, informants, 
and utility bills, the law enforcement officials were able to obtain a 
search warrant for Kyllo’s home.8  Agents found more than 100 
marijuana plants.9  Prosecutors indicted Kyllo with one count of 
manufacturing marijuana.10  Kyllo moved to suppress the evidence,11 
but suppression was unsuccessful, and Kyllo “entered a conditional 
guilty plea.”12  As a result, “[t]he Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing regarding the 
intrusiveness of thermal imaging.”13  On remand, the District Court of 
Oregon found that the Agema 210 “is a non-intrusive device that emits 
no rays or beams and shows a crude visual image of the heat being 
radiated from the outside of the house.”14  The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals then held that Kyllo had no subjective expectation of privacy 
in regard to the heat leaving his home, and there was “no objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager did not expose 
any intimate details.”15  However, the Supreme Court held that the 
Agema 210 scan was a search under the Fourth Amendment because a 
device that is not in “general public use” explored details of a home 
that could only be found through physical intrusion.16  
This Note will examine how the “general public use” test 
creates a loophole that allows for unwarranted searches that violate the 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment.  Section II will examine the 
 
6 Metal halide lights are commonly used for indoor growing because they produce a broad 
spectrum of light which is useful for growing plants. Kevin Espiritu, Metal Halide Grow 
Lights Explained and Reviewed, EPIC GARDENING, https://www.epicgardening.com/metal-
halide-grow-lights/ (last updated May 20, 2019).  Halide lights work by creating an electrical 
arc to ionize mercury and halide.  This chemical process requires a lot of power to run and 
75% of the light produced is heat.  Metal Halide Lamps, EDISON TECH CTR., 
https://edisontechcenter.org/metalhalide.html (last visited May 6, 2020); see also Bill 
Bernhardt, Metal Halide Bulbs: Workhorses of the Industry, CANNABIS CULTIVATION TODAY 
(July 27, 2016), https://cannabisindustryinstitute.com/news/metal-halide-bulbs-workhorses-
of-the-industry/. 








15 Id. at 31. 
16 Id. at 40. 
2
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original reasons behind the Fourth Amendment.  These reasons will 
then be applied to crafting a principle of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Section III will provide the history and evolution of the 
property-based analysis of the Fourth Amendment.  Section IV will 
provide an overview of current “see through the wall” technology 
available to law enforcement.  In addition, this Note will compare 
thermal imaging as it was when the Court decided Kyllo and the current 
state of thermal imaging.  Section V will examine Supreme Court cases 
that involved advanced technology relative to the time the Court 
decided the case.  These cases might provide guidelines on how a court 
should handle advanced sensing technology.  Section VI will explore 
how lower courts have dealt with the “general public use” test.  Except 
for a brief mention in a footnote, the Supreme Court did not provide 
any definition or formula to determine when the technology is in 
general public use.17  The lower courts have struggled to use this test 
and instead avoid it entirely and rule on cases using other elements of 
the case.  Section VI will discuss and then provide a workable 
definition of the “general public use” test.  Section VIII will explain 
why the property analysis is the proper framework to analyze advanced 
sensing technology. Section IX will conclude by proposing that to 
preserve the spirit of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court 
should eliminate the “general public use” test and only use the property 
test.  
II.  WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT? 
To understand the principle of the Fourth Amendment, it is 
important to discuss the events that influenced the Framers and the 
initial applications of the Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth Amendment 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.18   
 
17 Id. at 39 n.6. 
18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
3
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Searching for the original meaning in an amendment provides 
inherent difficulties because the Framers “had no opportunity to 
confront them [modern practices] or to consider the fundamentally 
different social conditions of today.”19  However, courts can 
reasonably ascertain the intent of the Framers through their words, the 
historical context, and the final draft of the Amendment.20  John 
Adams advised that “[i]n unforeseen cases, that is, when the state of 
things is found such as the author of the disposition has not foreseen, 
and could not have thought of, we should rather follow his intention 
than his words, and interpret the act as he himself would have 
interpreted it.”21 
 The Framers created the Fourth Amendment to protect against 
general warrants22 and writs of assistance.23  The “English customs 
officers enforced promiscuous searches vigorously and often in the 
American colonies.”24  Those searches heavily influenced “the Fourth 
Amendment’s framers when they rejected general warrants in 1789.”25  
Search and seizure of colonial ships were extensive because “[t]he 
same statute that codified writs of assistance in 1662 enabled British 
customs officers to search everything afloat at all times and without 
warrant.”26  In June 1768, the British seized John Hancock’s ship 
Liberty.27  The British seized the ship on “two separate counts of 
smuggling,”28 but Bostonians protested that the Liberty was seized 
 
19 James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of 
the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 671 (1985) (citing Anthony 
G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 396 (1974)). 
20 See infra notes 43-63 and accompanying text. 
21 Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1060 (2011) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Framers’ Intent]. 
22 “The general warrant, issued by a magistrate, provided government officials with an 
unlimited ability to search the home of anyone listed in the warrant, regardless of the nature 
of the violation alleged.”  Quin M. Sorenson, Comment, Losing a Plain View of Katz: The 
Loss of a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Under the Readily Available Standard, 107 DICK. 
L. REV. 179, 181 n.14 (2002).  
23 “The writ of assistance is most easily described as a form of a general warrant.  Under a 
writ of assistance, issued by a magistrate, customs officials could engage in arbitrary and 
effectively limitless searches of any home in which they suspected that prohibited goods may 
be located.”  Id. at 181 n.15. 
24 WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING, 602-
1791, at 258 (2009). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 419 (citing 13 and 14 Charles II, c.11, sec. 4 (1662), S.L., vol. 8, pg. 80). 
27 Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1019. 
28 CUDDIHY, supra note 24, at 589 n.54 (citation omitted). 
4
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with insufficient probable cause.29  The evidence that supported the 
seizure was circumstantial,30 and the colonists felt the seizure was 
politically motivated.31  The uproar led to British troops being sent to 
Boston.32  The result was the Boston Massacre in March 1770.33  
During the American Revolution a few years later, the American rebels 
used general warrants to aid in the revolution against Britain.34   
A Massachusetts law in 1777, which was used to identify 
Loyalists, allowed “the council to declare any person dangerous to the 
state, and authorized warrants by which sheriffs could ‘break open any 
dwelling house or other building’ in which they suspected that such a 
person was concealed.”35  In New York, “the Albany Committee of 
Correspondence allowed a colonel to ‘search . . . such places and 
Houses as he shall think proper’ for deserters from his detachment.36  
The largest search performed during the revolution targeted the 
Philadelphia Quakers.37  The Continental Congress asked the Supreme 
Executive Council of Pennsylvania to “search the house of every 
Philadelphian of dubious loyalty and disarm him.”38  The Continental 
Congress then passed a second resolve sent to every state government 
and advised them to seize every Quaker and their papers.39  After the 
war, the general warrant “remained the orthodox mode of search and 
seizure in five states: New York, Maryland, both Carolinas, and 
Georgia.”40  A general warrant was based on information provided 
under oath; however, the general warrant provided its bearer “‘to enter 
into and search . . . all cellars, shops, warehouses, and suspected 
places,’ using force if necessary.”41 
 
29 Id. at 589 (“[T]he Liberty, had been seized without ‘any probable cause of seizure that 
we know of.’” (citation omitted)). 
30 Id. at 590. 
31 Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1019-20; CUDDIHY, supra note 24, at 590. 
32 Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1019 (citing Admiralty-Revenue Jurisdiction, Editorial 
Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 106, at 98, 103 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel 
eds., 1965)). 
33 Id. (citing LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 32, at 98, 103). 
34 See CUDDIHY, supra note 24, at 613-23. 
35 Id. at 614 (citation omitted). 
36 Id. at 617 (citation omitted). 
37 Id. at 618. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. (“[A] pacifist manifesto evinced the disloyalty of many prominent Quakers.”). 
40 Id. at 623-24. 
41 Id. at 624 (citations omitted). 
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In the years following the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, 
its interpretation and application was similar yet different from our 
modern analysis.42  In addition to providing protection against general 
warrants and writs of assistance, the Fourth Amendment protected 
people from unreasonable government intrusions by ensuring certain 
criteria were met before a search was conducted.43  First, probable 
cause was required.44  The protection afforded by probable cause is 
that the allegations are true45 and reduces arbitrary intrusions.46  At the 
time of the Fourth Amendment, probable cause was not as robust as 
the current analysis.47  In the modern context, probable cause in 1789 
can be understood as information alleged to be at least possible or 
plausible.48   
Second, certain searches were deemed unreasonable.49  
Unreasonable searches included multiple-specific warrants, house 
searches without warrants, nocturnal searches, and “no-knock” 
searches.50  Third, certain objects were highly valued.51  The Fourth 
Amendment lists “four protected objects: persons, houses, papers, and 
effects.”52  The home has enjoyed special protection from very early 
times53 and can be viewed as a place where individuals can enjoy the 
privileges afforded to them by a free society.54  The protection of these 
objects ensures a person’s right to “the free enjoyment of personal 
security, of personal liberty, and of private property.”55 
 
42 See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text. 
43 See Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1056. 
44 Id. 
45 See CUDDIHY, supra note 24, at 754 (explaining that probable cause is supported by an 
oath or affirmation). 
46 See Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1006-10, 1057.  “Underlying all of those arguments 
and principles was a quest for objective criteria to measure the legitimacy of a search or 
seizure.”  Id. at 1006. 
47 See CUDDIHY, supra note 24, at 755 (“The current understanding of probable cause, 
however, is broader than that of 1789.”). 
48 Id. at 757 (“‘Probable’ had diverse meanings in 1789: ‘likely,’ ‘possible,’ even 
‘credible.’”). 
49 Id. at 770. 
50 Id. 
51 Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1058.  
52 Id. 
53 Tomkovicz, supra note 19, at 673.  “The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to 
all the forces of the Crown.  It may be frail . . . but the King of England may not enter; all his 
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.”  Id. at 673 n.120 (quoting 1 T. 
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 610 n.2 (8th ed. 1927)). 
54 See id. at 674. 
55 Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1059 (citation omitted). 
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The structure and wording of the Fourth Amendment illustrate 
the principles of search and seizure the Framers were advocating.56  
The Reasonableness Clause “recognized as already existing a right to 
freedom from arbitrary governmental invasion of privacy.”57  The 
second clause defines and interprets the first clause and provides that 
searches using the specified methods are not unreasonable.58  Further 
explanation of the Reasonableness Clause provides that searches must 
be carried out with judicial approval or they will be considered per se 
unreasonable, “subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”59   
In considering the Framers’ intent, one can use John Adams’s 
advice.60  When there is a situation that the author of an act did not 
account for, then one should follow the author’s intention and interpret 
it as he “would have interpreted it.”61  Applying this advice to the 
search and seizure practice before the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted, the Framers intended for the Amendment to protect people 
against unreasonable government intrusion.62  The Fourth Amendment 
protects against physical intrusions of a person’s home and seizures of 
their person, papers, and effects.63  However, a person is not protected 
when a loophole provides for warrantless searches.  The “general 
public use” test is a loophole and contradicts the principles of the 
Fourth Amendment.  The “general public use” test permits a home to 
be searched without a warrant issued under probable cause supported 
by an oath or affirmation. 
III.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROPERTY-
BASED ANALYSIS 
Property-based Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, in its first 
iteration, was based on a literal reading of the Fourth Amendment.64  
 
56 See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text; see infra notes 57-59 and accompanying 
text. 
57 Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 983 (citation omitted). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 984 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009)). 
60 Id. at 1060. 
61 Id. 
62 See id. at 988. 
63 Tomkovicz, supra note 19, at 673; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
64 THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 361 
(2d ed. 2014). 
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The Court described the physical trespass property-based analysis of 
the Fourth Amendment in Olmstead v. United States.65  Olmstead 
involved a criminal organization created “to import, possess, and sell 
liquor unlawfully.”66  The criminal organization was discovered using 
wiretaps.67  The Court reasoned that “[t]here was no searching. . . . The 
evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.  
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”68  The 
Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment is only implicated when 
something tangible is seized or the trespass is a physical intrusion.69  
After Olmstead, cases were decided by “whether the government had 
physically entered a protected area.”70 
In Katz v. United States,71 the Supreme Court seemingly 
abandoned the Olmstead view of the Fourth Amendment.72  An 
electronic listening device placed on the outside of a telephone booth 
was a search under the Fourth Amendment requiring a search 
warrant.73  The Government argued that there was no reason to invoke 
the Fourth Amendment because there was “no physical penetration of 
the telephone booth.”74  The Court reasoned “that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people – and not simply ‘areas.’” 75  The Fourth 
Amendment principle derived from Katz is that a search has not 
occurred “unless ‘the individual manifested a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the object of the challenged search,’ and ‘society [is] willing 
to recognize that expectation as reasonable.’”76  Katz asserted “that 
privacy, not property, was a centralizing principle upon which the 
Fourth Amendment rights were premised.”77 
 
65 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
66 Id. at 455-56. 
67 Id. at 456-57. 
68 Id. at 464. 
69 Id. at 466.  The Court explained that the Fourth Amendment is only violated when there 
is “an official search and seizure of his person . . . papers or tangible material effects, or an 
actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.”  Id. 
70 See CLANCY, supra note 64, at 87 (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967); 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
71 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
72 The reach of the Fourth Amendment “cannot turn upon a physical intrusion.”  See id. at 
353. 
73 See id. at 352-59. 
74 Id. at 352. 
75 Id. at 353. 
76 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting California 
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)). 
77 See CLANCY, supra note 64, at 88. 
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After Katz, the property-based analysis did not vanish 
entirely.78  The property-based analysis was most prominent in the 
application of seizure cases such as Soldal v. Cook County.79  Soldal 
involved an illegal seizure of a mobile home, but the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit held that the removal of the trailer was not a 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.80  The Seventh Circuit  held  that 
“absent interference with privacy or liberty, a ‘pure deprivation of 
property’ is not cognizable under the Fourth Amendment.”81  The 
Supreme Court did not agree with the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ narrow view of the Fourth Amendment.82  The Court stated 
that “our cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects 
property as well as privacy.”83  The cases decided following Katz did 
not eliminate protection of property;84 the message to derive from 
those cases is that “property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth 
Amendment violations.”85  Soldal dealt with the Fourth Amendment 
concerning a seizure.86  Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion in Soldal 
created the foundation for a re-emergence of property-analysis 
searches.87  
Kyllo is a stepping-stone on the re-emergence of the property 
analysis.  In Kyllo, the Court uses property-based language when it 
references constitutionally protected areas, explains privacy violations 
by using physical intrusion as a reference point, and describes what the 
Framers protected when the Fourth Amendment was created.88  
Nonetheless, Kyllo did not ignore “the essential lesson of Katz,” which 
 
78 See id. at 106-07. 
79 506 U.S. 56 (1992). 
80 See id. at 57-60. 
81 Id. at 60 (citation omitted). 
82 See id. at 62 (“[C]onclusion followed from a narrow reading of the Amendment, which 
the court construed to safeguard only privacy and liberty interests . . . leaving unprotected 
possessory interests where neither privacy nor liberty were at stake.”). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 64 (“There was no suggestion that this shift in emphasis had snuffed out the 
previously recognized protection for property under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
85 Id. 
86 See id. at 60-70. 
87 See id. at 62-65; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012) (“[T]he Court 
unanimously rejected the argument that although a ‘seizure’ had occurred ‘in a “technical” 
sense’. . .  no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because law enforcement had not 
‘invade[d] the [individuals’] privacy.’”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
88 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35, 38, 40 (2001). “This assures preservation of 
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.”  Id. at 34. 
9
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is that the Fourth Amendment protected “tangible and intangible 
interests and that the mode of invasion into those interests is not limited 
to physical intrusions.”89 
In United States v. Jones,90 the Court explained the co-
existence of the reasonable expectation of privacy test and the 
property-based analysis.  Jones involved the long-term surveillance of 
a car using GPS.91  The GPS was physically attached to the car.92  The 
Court held that the attachment of the GPS device to the car was a 
search.93  The Government argued that there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the exterior of the Jeep.94  The Court ignored 
the argument entirely “because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do 
not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”95  There is a minimum level 
of protection against the government that “Katz did not repudiate.”96  
The Court further explained that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law 
trespassory test.”97  
The property-based analysis provides a bright-line rule; the 
government cannot intrude on a home and curtilage without a 
warrant.98  Dog sniffs illustrate the effect of the bright-line rule because 
the Court has treated dog sniffs differently at other locations.99  In 
Florida v. Jardines,100 the Court held that a narcotics dog sniff 
penetrating the curtilage101 of the home is a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.102  The Court affirmed that the Fourth Amendment 
 
89 CLANCY, supra note 64, at 109; see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36 (“We rejected such a 
mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz . . . . Reversing that approach 
would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology.”). 
90 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
91 Id. at 402. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 404. 
94 Id. at 406. 
95 Id. 
96 See id. at 406-07. 
97 Id. at 409. 
98 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5-8 (2013). 
99 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding a canine sniff of luggage 
in an airport is not a search); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (holding a canine 
sniff during a traffic stop is not a search). 
100 569 U.S. 1 (2013). 
101 Id. at 6-7.  “We therefore regard the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with 
the home’—what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the home itself for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.’”  Id. at 6 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). 
102 Id. at 11. 
10
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property-based analysis is the minimum level of protection provided 
to people in their homes.103  Jardines is an example of how the property 
based analysis can protect the home.  Under the Katz formula, Justice 
Alito, writing for the dissent, would have allowed the dog sniff because 
“[a] reasonable person understands that odors emanating from a house 
may be detected from locations that are open to the public.”104  
However, since the porch is part of the curtilage of the home, “[t]he 
scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a 
particular area but also to a specific purpose.”105 
Current property-based analysis recognizes that a trespass to 
property can be physical or intangible.106  The Court has explained that 
property-based analysis is one of several frameworks for analyzing 
Fourth Amendment searches.107  Additionally, the Court has affirmed 
that certain areas are constitutionally protected areas that are not 
modified by an expectation of privacy.108  Therefore, the current 
property-based analysis is grounded in the original principles of the 
Fourth Amendment and upgraded by the understanding of unseen 
intrusions.109 
IV.  CURRENT ADVANCED SENSING TECHNOLOGY 
Imagine a situation similar to Kyllo in the year 2025.  A law 
enforcement officer suspects there is a marijuana growing operation in 
a home.  The officer stands on the sidewalk outside of the home, 
retrieves his or her cellphone, and performs an infrared scan of the 
home.  Law enforcement uses the information obtained from the 
 
103 See id. 
104 Id. at 17 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
105 Id. at 9.  “Here, the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not 
invite him there to conduct a search.”  Id. 
106 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (“[W]e rejected in Kyllo a 
‘mechanical interpretation’ of the Fourth Amendment.”) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 35 (2001)). 
107 See id. at 2214 n.1 (“Property rights are often informative . . . and we have repeatedly 
emphasized privacy interests do not rise and fall with property rights.”) (citations omitted)).  
The Court stated that “no single rubric definitively resolves which expectations of privacy are 
entitled to protection.”  Id. at 2213-14. “[M]ore recent Fourth Amendment cases have clarified 
that the test . . . derived from the second Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz . . . supplements, 
rather than displaces, ‘the traditional property-based understanding.’”  Byrd v. United States, 
138 S. Ct. 1518, 1526 (2018) (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11) 
108 See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018) (holding that the officer was not 
permitted to enter the curtilage of the home to search a vehicle). 
109 See CLANCY, supra note 64, at 106-115, 388-390. 
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cellphone scan, and other information such as utility bills, to obtain a 
search warrant.  Law enforcement officers search the house.  Is the 
infrared scan performed by the officer an unreasonable search under 
the Fourth Amendment?  Under Kyllo, if an average person can also 
perform an infrared scan with a cellphone, then the search was not 
unreasonable.110  While this scenario appears speculative, it is not.  
Infrared camera attachments for cellphones are already a reality.111  
Beyond the infrared scanning, law enforcement is also using see-
through wall technology.112  The see-through the wall technology is 
also steadily progressing into the realm of “general public use.”113  
Anyone who wants to perform repairs or construction, whether 
professionally or amateur, can use this technology to find wall studs, 
pipes, and wires behind walls.114  The technology is also being 
employed in various settings to track people through walls for security 
or health monitoring.115  If a person can buy a device and use it for a 
construction project at home, is that device now considered in “general 
public use?”  When does a device transition into general public use?  
Is it a matter of scope, depending on how far past the wall the device 
can detect objects?  Arguably, this technology is in public use.  
Applying the Kyllo test, a law enforcement official can scan the inside 
of a home without requiring a search warrant.  Examining these 
devices in more detail will provide an understanding of their capacity 
to violate the Fourth Amendment. 
The National Institute of Justice has classified several hand-
held devices as through-the-wall sensors (“TTWS”).116  These devices 
include Range-R series,117 Xaver series,118 ReTWis 5,119 and the 
 
110 See Kyllo v. U.S. 533 U.S. 27, 24 (2001). 
111 See infra notes 146, 148 and accompanying text. 
112 See infra notes 116-34 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text. 
114 How Do Stud Finders Work? Complete Tutorial + Tips and Tricks, 
ELECTRICSTUDFINDER.COM, http://electricstudfinder.com/how-do-stud-finders-work/ (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2020) [hereinafter ELECTRICSTUDFINDER]. 
115 VAYYAR, https://vayyar.com/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
116 MANTECH ADVANCED SYS. INT’L. INC., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THROUGH-THE-WALL-
SENSORS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT MARKET SURVEY 1 (2012), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00-
WallSensorReport-508.pdf [hereinafter MARKET SURVEY]. 
117 The Range-R series includes several models: Range-R, Range-R Link, Range-R 2D, 
Range-R 2D Link. Military and First Responders, CYTERRA, L3HARRIS, 
https://www2.l3t.com/cyterra/ (last visited May 8, 2020). 
118 The Xaver series includes several models: Xaver 100, 400, 800.  Xaver Products, 
CAMERO, https://www.camero-tech.com/xaver-products/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019). 
119 About ReTWis 5, RETIA, https://retwis.eu/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
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Eagle5-NCL.120  TTWS devices use radar121 transmitted at low power 
and across several frequencies.122  The radar penetrates walls and 
reflects when it comes into contact with an object or different 
materials.123  As the radar reflects off the objects or materials, the 
frequency shifts, and the measurement “distinguishes between 
stationary and moving objects.”124  When radar passes through objects, 
it becomes attenuated.125  Attenuation is the loss of signal strength.126  
Attenuation is reduced by using a wide range of frequencies to “probe” 
the area.127  To provide as much information about the area being 
“probed,” and to minimize attenuation problems, TTWS devices will 
use either a Pulse Wave System or an Ultra-Wide Band Pulse System 
(UWB).128  The difference between these two systems is the amount of 
information they relay back to the device.129  One specific limitation 
of the technology is that it cannot see through solid metal surfaces,130 
but it can operate through concrete and wood.131 
The devices can display information gathered in 1 degree (“d”), 
2d, or 3d.132  Other differences between the devices include various 
technical specifications such as the degrees of the field of view, the 
maximum distance of the scan, weight, and battery life.133  
 
120 TiaLinx Unveils New Breathing Detection Sensor to Identify Multiple Individuals 
Through Thick Concrete Walls, AZO SENSORS (July 13, 2016), 
https://www.azosensors.com/news.aspx?newsID=11326. 
121 Types of radar used include: Continuous Wave System, Pulse Wave System, and Ultra-
Wide Band Pulse System.  MARKET SURVEY, supra note 116, at 9-14. 
122 Becky Lewis, Through-the-Wall Sensor Technology Can Add Another Tool to the Kit, 
TECHBEAT 1 (2013), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/Through-the-Wall.pdf. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 MARKET SURVEY, supra note 116, at 4. 
126 Id. at 4. 
127 Id. at 5. 
128 See id. at 5-6. 
129 See id. at 4-6, 11-14. 
130 Lewis, supra note 122, at 1. 
131 MARKET SURVEY, supra note 116, at 4. 
132 1d, 2d, and 3d are shorthand for the dimensions provided by the display.  The difference 
between 1d and 2d is that 1d provides the range and status (moving/breathing) of the target 
and 2d will provide a graphic display of the area scanned, such as the general shape of the 
room, and multiple persons in the room.  See MANTECH ADVANCED SYS. INT’L. INC., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THROUGH-THE-WALL-SENSORS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT: BEST PRACTICES 
10 (2014), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/ThroughWallSensorBestPractices-508.pdf. 
133 MARKET SURVEY, supra note 116, at 11-16. 
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Additionally, the devices also differ in price.  For example, a Range-R 
will cost $6,000, but a Xaver-400 will cost $47,500.134 
Commercial applications of see-through the wall radar come in 
various forms.  One type of these devices is called a stud finder.135  
Stud finders use UWB radar to locate studs, pipes, and electronic wires 
in a wall.136  An example of this device is the Bosch D-Tect 150.  As 
of this writing, it is selling on Amazon for $699.36.137  The Bosch D-
Tect 150 has several detection modes, and it can detect objects between 
one to six inches, depending on the material.138  See-through the wall 
radar is also being sold as a home monitoring system.  One company 
currently selling this system is Vayyar.139  The Vayyar chip uses radar 
bands in the three gigahertz to 81 gigahertz range along with 72 
receivers and transmitters to track people through walls and is capable 
of detecting their “location, movement, height, posture, and vital 
signs.”140  The Vayyar HOME can be combined with various 
appliances, lighting, and heating for home automation.141  Three other 
uses for the system include eldercare, detecting if someone has fallen 
in the home, or monitoring the health of people in a home.142  Finally, 
Vayyar HOME helps in home security by detecting when everyone has 
fallen asleep and will then detect if an intruder has entered, at which 
time an alarm is activated.143 
In Kyllo, the Agema-210 was an infrared thermal imager.144  
Heat detecting devices have been around for several decades.145  
Infrared thermal imaging devices have continued to advance from the 
 
134 Id. at 15. 
135 ELECTRICSTUDFINDER, supra note 114. 
136 Id. 
137 Bosch D-Tect 150, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Bosch-D-Tect-Floor-Scanner-
Technology/dp/B005EM93R0 (last visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
138  D-Tect 150 Product Description, BOSCH, 
https://www.boschtools.com/us/en/boschtools-ocs/stud-finders-d-tect-150-29179-p/ (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2020). 
139 VAYYAR, https://vayyar.com/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2020). 
140 Technology, VAYYAR, https://vayyar.com/technology (last visited Jan. 18, 2020). 
141 Smart Home, VAYYAR, https://vayyar.com/smart-home (last visited Jan. 18, 2020). 
142 Home Health, VAYYAR, https://vayyar.com/home (last visited Jan. 18, 2020). 
143 Home Security and Fire, VAYYAR, https://vayyar.com/home-security-and-fire (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2020). 
144 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001). 
145 The first thermographic camera was created by Kálmán Tihanyi in 1929.  Nic Fleming, 
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time of the Kyllo decision; many different models are available to the 
average person.146  These products are cheaper than the Agema-210147 
and provide more detail and accuracy than the Agema-210.148  If the 
average person has access to thirty models of infrared cameras and 
even the ability to attach an infrared camera to their smartphone, it is 
arguably in “general public use.”  Under the current Kyllo rule, a police 
officer using one of these devices to scan a home without a warrant 
would not be violating the Fourth Amendment.  The Kyllo rule 
loophole is already a possibility. 
V.  SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY 
While it is impossible to predict the exact path technological 
progress will take, the trend is usually for smaller and more portable.149  
The evolution of the infrared camera displays this trend; the infrared 
camera evolved from large bulky devices to attachments that people 
 
146 At the time of this writing, 30 products are available and some products have different 
models.  See Handheld Thermal Cameras, FLIR, 
https://www.flir.com/browse/industrial/handheld-thermal-cameras/?page=2 (last visited Mar. 
8, 2020).  Thermal cameras can also attach to a smartphone.  FLIR ONE Pro, FLIR, 
https://www.flir.com/products/flir-one-pro/?model=435-0006-02 (last visited Mar. 8, 2020).  
The PerfectPrime is an infrared camera available on Amazon that comes in different models 
and ranges in price from $129.99 to $299.99 at the time of this writing.  PerfectPrime IR0002 
Thermal Camera, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Perfect-Prime-IR0001-Infrared-
Resolution Temperature/dp/B075F61GFH?ref_=fsclp_pl_dp_5 (last visited Apr. 20, 2020). 
147 Considering the time when the Agema-210 was used, it probably cost at least $10,000.  
See Adam W. Brill, Case Note, Kyllo v. United States: Is the Court’s Bright-Line Rule on 
Thermal Imaging Written in Disappearing Ink?, 56 ARK. L. REV. 431, 433 n.13 (2003) 
(reporting that thermal imagers range from $15,000 to $35,000); see also Ed Kochanek, 
Thermal Imaging from the Beginning of the Thermographer’s Camera to the Present, 
IRINFO.ORG, https://irinfo.org/12-1-2013-kochanek/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) (explaining 
that a thermal camera sold for $25,000 in 1997). 
148 Contrast the Agema-210 technical specification with a $10,000+ modern model or the 
smartphone camera. AGEMA INFRARED SYSTEMS, THERMOVISION 210 SERIES OPERATING 
MANUAL Section 6 at 1-9 (2002), 
https://support.flir.com/DocDownload/Assets/dl/1557627$a.pdf; AGEMA INFRARED SYSTEMS, 
THERMOVISION 400 & 200 (1990), 
https://support.flir.com/DocDownload/Assets/dl/1557569$a.pdf; FLIR, TECHNICAL DATA 
FLIR T5XX SERIES (2019), https://support.flir.com/DocDownload/Assets/dl/t810463-en-
us.pdf; FLIR, FLIR One Pro, https://support.flir.com/DocDownload/Assets/dl/17-1746-oem-
flir_one_pro_datasheet_final_v1_web.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2019). 
149 See From Bricks to Brains: The Evolution of the Cell Phone, COMPUTER SCIENCE DEGREE 
HUB, https://www.computersciencedegreehub.com/cell-phone/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2020); 
Frank Olito, Computers Actually Date Back to the 1930s. Here’s How They’ve Changed, 
INSIDER (Sept. 13, 2019, 12:13 PM) https://www.insider.com/how-computers-evolved-
history-2019-9. 
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can place on a phone.150  A corollary to this progress is that devices 
created for the military might become available for the general public; 
an example of this progress is the internet151 and GPS devices.152  With 
this trend in mind, judging the validity of a search on whether the 
public is using an item is a precarious position. 
In assessing the proper lens to view advanced sensing 
technology searches, an analysis of how the Supreme Court has dealt 
with other types of technology and its rationale in these cases might 
provide insight. 
Justice Harlan’s “oft-quoted concurrence”153 established the 
Katz subjective expectation of privacy test.154  Considering the 
influence of the concurrence, one should examine Justice Harlan’s 
reasoning.  Interestingly, Justice Harlan anchored his opinion in 
relation to a place.155  The Fourth Amendment protects people, but the 
amount of protection afforded is related to a place.156  “Thus a man’s 
home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy . . . .”157  
However, “objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 
‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to 
keep them to himself has been exhibited.”158  Justice Harlan concluded 
that basing Fourth Amendment violations on physical trespass was no 
longer viable because law enforcement can use electronic means to 
defeat a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.159  The 
concurrence and majority opinion responded to the electronic listening 
device by extending “protection to intangible interests.”160 
In United States v. Karo,161 a beeper was used to trace a can of 
ether.  DEA agents learned that James Karo, Richard Horton, and 
William Harley ordered 50 cans of ether to extract cocaine from 
 
150 See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text. 
151 Evan Andrews, Who Invented the Internet?, HISTORY, 
https://www.history.com/news/who-invented-the-internet (last updated Oct. 28, 2019). 
152 Global Positioning System History, NASA, 
https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/heo/scan/communications/policy/GPS_History.html (last 
updated Aug. 7, 2017). 
153 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). 
154 See CLANCY, supra note 64, at 92. 




159 Id. at 362. 
160 See CLANCY, supra note 64, at 89. 
161 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
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imported clothing.162  Agents replaced one of the cans of the ether with 
their can that contained the beeper.163  Eventually, on February 6, 1981, 
the can of ether was transported to a home in Taos, New Mexico.164  
The “agents determined, using the beeper monitor[,] that the beeper 
can was still inside the house.”165  On February 7, the beeper reported 
the ether can was still in the house.166  Based partly on this information, 
the agents acquired a warrant on February 8, 1981.167  The Court held 
that the warrantless use of the beeper was a search that violated the 
Fourth Amendment.168  The home is where an “individual normally 
expects privacy.”169  The Court reasoned that where the Government 
uses “an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have 
obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house,” it is 
an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.170  Unfortunately for the defendants, after striking the 
beeper information, the warrant affidavit contained enough 
information to support probable cause for a search warrant.171 
While not strictly human-made like other technologies are, 
narcotics sniffing dogs can also be described as a sense-enhancing 
technology.172  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, decided 
Jardines on property grounds.173  The government argued that law 
enforcement investigation of a home by a forensic narcotics dog “by 
definition could not implicate any legitimate privacy interest.”174  
However, as Justice Scalia explained, the home and curtilage are a 
constitutionally protected area that is unaffected by expectations of 
 
162 Id. at 708. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 709. 
165 Id. at 709-10. 
166 Id. at 710. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 714-15. 
169 Id. at 714. 
170 Id. at 715. 
171 Id. at 721. 
172 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 14-15 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring).  But cf. United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding a canine sniff of luggage in an airport is not a 
search); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding a canine sniff during a traffic stop 
is not a search). 
173 See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 3-12. “The Katz reasonable-expectations of privacy test ‘has 
been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 11 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012)). 
174 Id. at 10. 
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privacy.175  If law enforcement intrudes upon a constitutionally 
protected area without authorization, then a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment has occurred.176  Justice Kagan, in a concurring opinion, 
reasoned that the case could have been decided using Kyllo.177  A 
narcotics sniffing dog is similar to a sense enhancing tool that is not in 
“general public use” because the narcotics dog can explore details of 
the home that have an expectation of privacy.178  Justice Kagan’s 
application of Kyllo is sound because the general public does not use 
narcotics dogs.  However, deciding Jardines through the Kyllo test 
would have further weakened the constitutionally protected areas 
through the use of the “general public use” test.  In using the property 
analysis, the Court affirmed the minimum level of protection provided 
by the curtilage.179  
VI.  HOW THE LOWER COURTS HAVE DEALT WITH THE 
GENERAL PUBLIC USE TEST 
In Kyllo, the Supreme Court did not provide a definition or 
outline to determine when an item is in “general public use.”180  
Because the Supreme Court did not provide direction for the lower 
courts, the resulting jurisprudence has not been consistent.181  Courts 
have avoided determining whether an item is in “general public use,” 
unless the item, such as a camera, is easily considered to be in “general 
public use.”182 
A state appeals court avoided examination of an item’s 
“general public use” in McClelland v. State.183  Daryl J. McClelland 
was arrested by police officers who were investigating individuals who 
 
175 Id. at 5-11. 
176 Id. at 10-12. 
177 Id. at 14 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
178 Id. at 14-15 (Kagan J., concurring). 
179 See id. at 5. 
180 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 39 n.6 (2001) (“Given that we can quite confidently 
say that thermal imagining is not ‘routine,’ we decline in this case to reexamine that factor.”). 
181 See McClelland v. State, 255 So. 3d 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018); United States v. 
Hachey, No. 16-0128, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34192 (D. Pa. 2017); United States v. Vela, 486 
F. Supp 2d 587 (D. Tex. 2005); United States v. Deleston, No. 15-cr-113, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 107341 (D.N.Y. 2015); Idaho v. Howard, No. CR-2011-2029, 2012 Ida. Dist. LEXIS 
31 (2012). 
182 See cases cited supra note 181. 
183 255 So. 3d 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). 
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downloaded child pornography.184  The police officers traced 
McClelland’s Wi-Fi signal using a Yagi antenna.185  At trial, 
McClelland moved to suppress the child pornography found on his 
computer because “the Yagi antenna constituted an enhanced 
technology which breached the expectation of privacy that McClelland 
had within his motorhome.”186  The trial court concluded that 
McClelland did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because 
he was broadcasting signals outside his motorhome and that the use of 
the Yagi antenna was lawful because it was in “general public use.”187  
The Florida District Court of Appeal reviewing the case declined to 
examine the issue of “general public use” because it was sufficient that 
McClelland lacked an expectation of privacy.188  Further, the District 
Court of Appeal reasoned that unlike Kyllo, who confined his activities 
to his home, McClelland “extend[ed] ‘an invisible, virtual arm,’”189 
which put him “beyond the safe harbor provided by Kyllo.”190  As 
McClelland illustrates, the property-based analysis of Kyllo extends an 
impenetrable wall to the home because the Supreme Court expanded it 
to “any information regarding the interior of the home.”191 
Courts have decided that night vision goggles, flashlights, and 
cameras are in “general public use.”192  Courts have not provided in-
depth analyses as to why these products are in the “general public 
use.”193  Flashlights or cameras do not require an in-depth analysis 
because of their availability as consumer products for decades.194  As 
 
184 Id. at 930-31. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 931. 
187 Id. at 932. 
188 Id. at 932 n.2 (“It is unnecessary for us to make any determination regarding whether 
this was an accurate conclusion due to our agreement with the trial court that McClelland 
lacked an expectation of privacy that society would be willing to recognize as reasonable.”). 
189 Id. at 933 (citation omitted). 
190 Id. at 934 (citation omitted). 
191 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
192 See United States v. Vela, 486 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W. D. Tex. 2005); United States v. 
Deleston, No. 15-cr-113, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107341 (D.N.Y. 2015); Idaho v. Howard, 
No. CR-2011-2029, 2012 Ida. Dist. LEXIS 31 (2012). 
193 See cases cited supra note 192. 
194 The first camera was introduced in 1888.  Original Kodak Camera Serial No. 540, NAT’L 
MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., https://americanhistory.si.edu/collections/search/object/nmah_760118 
(last visited Jan. 18, 2020).  The flashlight was patented in 1899.  Mary Bellis, The Invention 
of the Flashlight, THOUGHTCO. (last updated Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/invention-of-the-flashlight-1991794. 
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for the night vision goggles, the court in United States v. Vela195 
reasoned that “they are available to the public via internet.  More 
economical night vision goggles are available at sporting goods stores.  
Therefore, night vision goggles . . . are available for general public 
use.”196 
United States v. Stanley197 involved MoocherHunter, which is 
a software that police use to locate computers that are piggy-backing 
onto other Wi-Fi routers.198  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
held the use of the software was not a Fourth Amendment search.199  
The court summarized its reasoning in two points.  First, if a person is 
intentionally sharing his or her activities outside of the confines of the 
home, then the privacy protections afforded by the home are lost.200  
Second, a person who uses a third-party Wi-Fi router without consent 
in an attempt to disguise a signal’s origin has no legitimate expectation 
of privacy.201  In this case, the government did not argue that the 
MoocherHunter can be defined as an item in “general public use.”202  
However, since it is a “software tool that can be downloaded for free 
. . . and used by anyone with a laptop computer and directional 
antennae,”203 it is arguably in “general public use.”  Stanley is an 
example of another case decided on grounds other than the “general 
public use” test. 
VII.  A DEFINITION OF GENERAL PUBLIC USE 
Another source that can be examined to define “general public 
use” is the definitions section of the Federal Acquisition Regulations 
System.204  Under section 2.101, there are eight types of items that are 
considered commercial items.205  Relevant portions include:  
 
195 486 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2005). 
196 Id. at 590. 
197 753 F.3d 114, 115-17 (3d Cir. 2014). 
198 The MoocherHunter is a software tool that uses “a laptop computer and a directional 
antenna.”  Id. at 116.  “[T]he “user enters the MAC address of the wireless card he wishes to 
locate[,] and the program measures the signal strength of the radio waves emitted from this 
card.”  Id. 
199 See id. at 120-122. 
200 Id. at 119-20.  
201 Id. at 120-21.  “Stanley, was in effect, a virtual trespasser.”  Id. at 120. 
202 Id. at 119. 
203 Id. at 116. 
204 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (LEXIS through the Sept. 9, 2019 issue of the Federal Register). 
205 Id. 
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(1) Any item, other than real property, that is of a type 
customarily used by the general public or by non-
governmental entities for purposes other than 
governmental purposes, and  
(i) Has been sold, leased, or licensed to the general 
public; or 
(ii) Has been offered for sale, lease, or license to the 
general public; 
Commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) item - - 
(1) means any item of supply (including construction 
material) that is - - 
(i) A commercial item (as defined in paragraph (1) of 
the definition in this section); 
(ii) Sold in substantial quantities in the commercial 
marketplace;206 
When considering these factors and the lower court 
decisions,207 an item is in “general public use” when two conditions 
are met.  First, is the item accessible to an average person?  An item is 
accessible if the item can be bought at a store or on the internet.  An 
item is not accessible if it is only available to the government.  Second, 
what is the level of difficulty in acquiring the item?  While an item 
may be accessible to the public, the item’s price can increase the 
difficulty in obtaining the item.  An item that costs $10,000 is much 
more challenging to acquire than an item that costs $100, even if the 
item is available to the general public.  If these factors are applied, a 
camera, a flashlight, and night vision goggles available in sporting 
goods stores and the internet would be found in “general public use.”  
Additionally, applying these factors would also place current thermal 
imaging and some see-through the wall devices in the “general public 
use” category. 
VIII.  COURTS SHOULD ANALYZE ADVANCED SENSING 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A PROPERTY ANALYSIS 
Courts should analyze advanced sensing technology under a 
property rubric.  Property analysis provides a bright-line for courts to 
use.  The property-based cases illustrate this.  In Kyllo, the Court 
 
206 Id. 
207 See cases cited supra note 181. 
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declined to determine if there was a difference between thermal 
information coming off the wall or through the wall.208  This type of 
analysis is too mechanical, “the approach would leave the homeowner 
at the mercy of advancing technology.”209  In Collins and Jardines, 
once the curtilage was invaded, further analysis was unnecessary.210  
There is a license to walk up to a door and knock as custom dictates,211 
but “[t]here is no customary invitation”212 to engage in a forensic dog 
search of the area around the door.213  In Collins, a motorcycle under a 
tarp was protected from a police search because it fell under the 
umbrella of the curtilage.214  The Court did not see a reason to apply 
the vehicle exception.215  The Court explained the protection of the 
curtilage by analogy to another scenario:   
Imagine a motorcycle parked inside the living room of 
a house, visible through a window to a passerby on the 
street. Imagine further that an officer has probable 
cause to believe that the motorcycle was involved in a 
traffic infraction. Can the officer, acting without a 
warrant, enter the house to search the motorcycle and 
confirm whether it is the right one? Surely not.216   
The Court in Jones did not determine “thorny” questions of 
which length of time or quality of surveillance intruded on Jardines’ 
reasonable expectation of privacy.217  Instead, the physical intrusion of 
the device on the car was enough to decide the violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.218  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Jardines, 
provided a succinct reason to use the property analysis.  Justice Scalia 
 
208 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-39 (2001). 
209 Id. at 35. 
210 “[W]e need not decide whether the officers’ investigation of Jardines’ home violated his 
expectation of privacy under Katz.”  Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013).  “The 
automobile exception does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter a . . . curtilage in 
order to search a vehicle therein.”  Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018). 
211 Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7-8. 
212 Id. at 9. 
213 Id. 
214 Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670-1672, 1675. 
215 Id. at 1671-74. 
216 Id. at 1671. 
217 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412-13 (2012). 
218 Id. at 412-13 (“We may have to grapple with these ‘vexing problems’ in some future 
case where a classic trespassory search is not involved . . . but there is no reason for rushing 
forward to resolve them here.”).  
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said that “[o]ne virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights 
baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.”219   
After nineteen years, the Supreme Court has yet to provide a 
workable framework to determine when an item is in “general public 
use.”  The Court’s reluctance to define “general public use” provides 
further support to no longer using the “general public use” test.  
Further, it is likely that even if the Court created a workable framework 
for “general public use,” it would nonetheless still leave a loophole to 
circumvent the Fourth Amendment.  As Section IV shows, it is hard to 
imagine a scenario where these advanced sensing technologies will not 
be in “general public use” within a decade.  Arguably, thermal imagers 
are already in that category.220  If the Court decided cases using the 
property analysis, where appropriate, then courts will not have to waste 
time determining if an item is in “general public use” or to try to find 
an alternative means of deciding the case.  Since the property analysis 
is a bright-line rule, courts will not be ambivalent as to how they should 
proceed.  While it is still early in the development cycle of some 
advanced technologies, there is no reason to provide police with the 
means to evade the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment.  As 
John Adams said, “when the state of things is found such as the author 
of the disposition has not foreseen, and could not have thought of . . . 
interpret the act as he himself would have interpreted it.”221  It is 
reasonable to conclude from the Framers’ position on unreasonable 
searches of their time that they would also find technology that can see 
into a person’s home is not a reasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The “general public use” standard also contradicts the Kyllo 
decision itself.  While Kyllo benefitted the property analysis by 
adopting the concept of intangible protection from Katz, the “general 
public use test” defeats that extra protection.  It is a logical fallacy to 
create a constitutionally protected area, yet at the same time provide a 
means by which law enforcement can intrude upon that area at some 
undefined future time. 
Similar to the Jardines property-based ruling, a police officer 
should not be allowed to invade a home’s curtilage to use a hand-held 
or portable advanced sensing device to examine the interior of the 
home.  Additionally, as the property-analysis also protects against 
 
219 Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S 1, 11 (2013). 
220 See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text. 
221 Framers’ Intent, supra note 21, at 1060 (citation omitted). 
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intangible intrusions of a constitutionally protected area, then a search 
of a home beyond the curtilage with advanced sensing technology 
should also not be allowed. 
The rule would not be complete without the exigent 
circumstances exception.  The use of advanced searching technology 
without a warrant should be allowed in those specific circumstances.222  
Further, the courts should account for the naked eye observation of a 
law enforcement official as an exception.223  A reasonable application 
of the naked eye observation exception is illustrated by a hypothetical 
scenario.  A police officer views contraband or illegal activity through 
a window from a public area.  The police officer can then, within a 
reasonable time frame from the observation, use the advanced sensing 
technology to provide further information.  Of course, even under the 
naked eye observation, the officer should be held to the exigency 
standard.  The situation must call for a “warrantless search [that] is 
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”224  Therefore, if 
the situation observed meets the exigency standard for warrantless 
entry, then it follows that an advanced sensing search would also be 
valid. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
This Note is not intended to diminish or dismiss the usefulness 
of advanced sensing technology to law enforcement officials.  These 
devices contribute to public safety and crime prevention.  However, it 
is equally as essential to respect the rights accorded to every person 
under the Law and the Constitution.   
The Supreme Court intended the Kyllo rule as a bright-line test 
for the use of advanced sensing technology.  However, the addition of 
the “general public use” test defeats that purpose.  Technology that can 
see into a home is arguably accessible to the general public.  
Additionally, courts struggle to apply the “general public use” test.  
Therefore, to preserve the spirit of the Fourth Amendment and provide 
a clear guide to the lower courts, searches involving advanced sensing 
 
222 Some situations include “hot pursuit,” imminent destruction of evidence, and the 
preservation of life.  See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S 398, 403-04 (2006). 
223 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“The Fourth Amendment protection 
of the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes 
when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.”). 
224 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. 
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technology should be analyzed under a property analysis.  Advanced 
sensing technology that invades the curtilage of the home or penetrates 
the walls to see into the interior of the home is presumptively 
unreasonable and requires a warrant.  The new rule is a combination 
of Kyllo, and the framework advanced in Katz.  The home and the 
curtilage are constitutionally protected areas that law enforcement 
cannot intrude upon using any method, both physical and intangible.  
Therefore, the property analysis would provide coverage well into the 
future as science creates new methods to see the unseen. 
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